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Abstract
Reappraisal is a widely investigated emotion regulation strategy, often impaired in those with 
acquired brain injury (ABI). Little is known, however, about the tools to measure this capacity in 
patients, who may find traditional reappraisal tasks difficult. Fifty five participants with ABI, and 
thirty five healthy controls (HCs), completed reappraisal tasks with personal and impersonal 
emotion elicitation components, questionnaires measuring reappraisal (the ERQ-CA), and 
neuropsychological assessment. The main findings demonstrated that both groups produced 
more reappraisals, and rated their reappraisal ideas as more effective for personal stimuli. The 
ABI group were significantly faster to generate reappraisals for personal, compared to 
impersonal, stimuli. Yet, participants with ABI performed worse than HCs on the majority of 
reappraisal components, across both reappraisal tasks. Results of regression analyses revealed 
significant relationships between certain measures of cognitive control and certain reappraisal 
components, which varied for the personal and impersonal reappraisal task. Notably, while 
inhibition predicted aspects of reappraisal in both the ABI and HC group, working memory was 
only related to reappraisal in participants with ABI. The study suggests that personal context 
plays a key role in reappraisal, and proposes a model to better understand the role of cognitive 
control across the reappraisal process. 
Acquired brain injury (ABI) is a major public health concern (Corrigan, Selassie, & 
Oman, 2010; Tagliaferri, Compagnone, Korsic, Servadei, & Kraus, 2006), with survivors 
experiencing complex psychological impairment that can, in many cases, contribute to 
significant disability (Andelic, Hammergren, Bautz-Holter, Sveen, et al., 2009; Bramlett & 
Dietrich, 2015; Dijkers, 2004). Of these consequences, the emotional element is typically the 
greatest source of distress in patients and their relatives (Diaz, Schwarzbold, Thais, Hohl, et al., 
2012; Ergh, Rapport, Coleman, & Hanks, 2002). Developing an understanding of ways to 
manage emotions after ABI, however, is further complicated by a methodological difficulty in 
measuring various emotional processes. 
Emotion regulation after brain injury
Despite the large body of research into various emotional sequelae following brain injury 
(Williams & Evans, 2003; Hesdorffer, Rauch, & Tamminga, 2009, for a review), studies which 
have focused on emotion regulation (ER) strategies have been comparatively sparse (Beer & 
Lombardo, 2007; Salas, Gross, & Turnbull, 2019). There is widespread agreement in the 
literature that there are a range of strategies that can be employed to influence the intensity of 
emotions, and the way in which they are experienced and expressed (Gross & Thompson, 2007; 
Gross, 2013; 2015). The Process Model, which is the most influential model of ER in the 
literature of neurotypical participants, consists of several strategies: situation selection, situation 
modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change (reappraisal), and response modulation 
(Gross, 2013). This model has provided an effective framework for the investigation of 
regulatory processes in the psychiatric literature (Hu, Zhang, Wang, Mistry, et al., 2014, for a 
meta-analysis), and may be a promising framework to investigate ER difficulties after brain 
injury (Salas et al., 2019, for a review).
By far the most well-investigated method for modulating feelings is the cognitive change 
strategy of reappraisal (Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner, Silvers, & Buhle, 
2012). This involves re-interpreting an event, sometimes changing its meaning, to modify its 
emotional consequences (Gross & Thompson, 2007; Gross, 2015).  Though the majority of 
research has focused on the down-regulation of negative emotions, reappraisal can also be used 
for the up-regulation of positive emotions (Gross, 2015; McRae & Gross, 2020; Silton, Kahrilas, 
Skymba, Smith, Bryant, & Heller, 2020). In neurologically healthy individuals, reappraisal has 
been a strategy of particular interest to understand various elements of emotional 
symptomatology, such as stress (Lewis, Yoon, & Joormann, 2018), depression (Joormann & 
Gotlib, 2010), and anxiety (Goldin, Manber-Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009). 
The number of studies which have investigated reappraisal in people with ABI remains 
modest (Salas et al., 2019, for a review). However, the study of participants with brain injury has 
contributed much to the understanding of the underlying cognitive mechanisms of reappraisal. 
For example, Falquez, Couto, Ibañez, and colleagues (2014) found that lesions to the right 
superior frontal gyrus, an area responsible for inhibitory control, were associated with poorer 
reappraisal effectiveness. Additionally, investigations of the generative components of 
reappraisal have identified inhibition, verbal ability (Salas, Turnbull, & Gross, 2014; Salas, 
Gross, Rafal, Viñas-Guasch, & Turnbull, 2013), and working memory (Rowlands, Coetzer, & 
Turnbull, 2019) as key components of the process. These generative components of reappraisal 
involve the timely construction of positive re-interpretations, and thus the creation of a 
reappraisal itself (i.e. creating a reappraisal). This generative aspect needs to be distinguished 
from other components, such as reappraisal effectiveness, since generating a reappraisal does not 
automatically mean it will be effective in altering one’s emotional response. 
The capacity to generate reappraisals can be selectively impaired in those with ABI. In 
particular, patients with brain injury took longer to generate a reappraisal (referred to as 
reappraisal difficulty), but when time was not considered they were able to produce a similar 
number of reappraisals (referred to as reappraisal productivity) to neurologically healthy controls 
(Salas et al., 2014). Extending on these findings, Rowlands et al (2019) found that patients with 
ABI were impaired across both reappraisal productivity and difficulty on an autobiographical 
recall reappraisal task, and reported less effective use of reappraisal to up-regulate positive 
emotions. 
Considered together, these studies provide evidence, complementary to extensive 
neuroimaging work in healthy controls, suggesting that reappraisal is associated with areas of 
cognitive control (Buhle, Silvers, Wager, Lopez, et al., 2014, for meta-analysis), in particular 
working memory (Hendricks & Buchanan, 2016). This two-stage process proposes that certain 
cognitive control capacities may be important for the early phase of disengaging from the initial 
appraisal (inhibition) and generating new interpretations (verbal ability) (Kalisch, 2009; Salas et 
al., 2014). In the second phase, the reappraisal needs to be maintained (using working memory), 
to shield it from the initial meaning (Kalisch, 2009). Recent evidence suggests that working 
memory may also play a role in the early phase, perhaps to keep the goal of reappraising in mind 
(Rowlands et al., 2019). 
Some inconsistencies are, however, notable in previous studies. It is possible that these 
are due in part to the methods used to measure reappraisal (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). For 
example, using a reappraisal task based on personal stimuli, Rowlands and colleagues (2019) 
reported that working memory was the only significant predictor of reappraisal. In contrast, Salas 
and colleagues (2014), who used impersonal stimuli, reported that inhibition and verbal ability 
was predictive of reappraisal, but not working memory. To better understand the 
neuropsychological capacities involved in reappraisal, it is important to investigate these 
mechanisms for both types of stimuli, within the same sample. 
Emotion elicitation methods
Researchers looking at various affective processes have increasingly studied emotion and 
its elicitation with more naturalistic methods (Chirico, Cipresso, & Gaggioli, 2018; Salas, 
Radovic, & Turnbull, 2012; Salas, Radovic, Castro, & Turnbull, 2015; Siedlecka & Denson, 
2019). For example, participants being required to carry out a frustrating task with punishment to 
induce anger (Lobbestael, Arntz, & Wiers, 2008), and mental imagery to induce a range of 
emotions (Zhang, Yu, & Barrett, 2014). Of particular relevance for emotion elicitation may be 
personally salient information, as in Affective Story Recall (Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005). 
This involves generating personal affective memories, in order to reactivate and re-experience 
previous emotions (Prkachin, Williams-Avery, Zwaal, & Mills, 1999). Autobiographical recall 
tasks have been shown to elicit target emotions effectively, including the associated subjective 
experience and peripheral physiology (Siedlecka & Denson, 2019, for a review). Nonetheless, 
impersonal visual stimuli remain some of the most widely used emotional tools in experimental 
research (Lench, Flores, & Bench, 2011). 
The relevance of personal salience for emotion elicitation has prompted some to 
investigate the feasibility of such procedures for reappraisal research (Holland & Kensinger, 
2013; Speed, Levinson, Gross, Kiosses, & Hajcak, 2017). Reappraisal tasks using 
autobiographical recall elicitation have largely shown that they are effective tools to measure the 
modulation of emotions, and show similar activation patterns in neuroimaging studies to 
traditional impersonal tasks (Holland & Kensinger, 2013). These studies are, however, limited in 
that no comparisons have yet been made between such tasks, making it difficult to infer the 
difference between reappraisal for impersonal and personal affective stimuli.  
The choice of elicitation procedures is a particularly important methodological question 
to consider in the context of participants with brain injury. This is because they often present 
with cognitive difficulties, which may impact upon their ability to effectively engage with visual 
stimuli (Levenson, 2007), or to follow the plot in film clips (Levenson, Ascher, Goodkind, 
McCarthy, et al., 2008, Salas et al., 2015). In addition, difficulties with empathy (de Sousa, 
McDonals, Rushby, Dimoska, & James, 2010; Williams & Wood, 2010) and emotion perception 
have long been established as common impairments following ABI (Bornhofen & McDonald, 
2008 for a review; Prigatano & Pribram, 1982). 
Only one study has systematically compared personal (i.e. internal) and impersonal (i.e. 
external) emotion elicitation tools in patients with neurological damage, and concluded that 
target emotions were elicited at higher intensities when recalling personal affective memories 
(Salas et al., 2015). Interestingly, such methodological comparisons have not been carried out to 
the same extent in emotion regulation research. Personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks have 
important methodological distinctions in the emotion elicitation component, which is a necessary 
first step to investigate the subsequent emotion regulation attempts. Where impersonal tasks 
involve the generation of emotional responses from stimuli presented from the outside (i.e. 
externally), and personal tasks involve the generation of emotion from stimuli which the person 
generates themselves (i.e. internally).
The present study 
Previous work has demonstrated that a personal emotion elicitation task (the Affective 
Story Recall task) can be used to measure reappraisal in neurological patients (Rowlands et al., 
2019). However, with the absence of a direct comparison with an impersonal elicitation task 
(such as visual stimuli) there is a lack of understanding regarding the difference in reappraisal for 
personal and impersonal stimuli. The primary aim of the present study was to provide a direct 
comparison of performance on a reappraisal task with personally-salient stimuli (i.e. the ASRR 
task; Turnbull, Evans, & Owen, 2005; Salas et al., 2015; Rowlands et al., 2019), with 
performance on a reappraisal task with standardised, impersonal, stimuli (i.e. pictures from the 
International Affective Picture System, IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) in both patients 
with ABI and healthy controls (Analysed under the sub-heading ‘Personal versus impersonal 
reappraisal’). This aimed to provide better understanding of the importance of personal context 
for reappraisal, and which task might be easier or most effective for measuring reappraisal in 
patients with ABI.  
As part of a wider research study, there were a number of secondary aims. Firstly, to 
extend previous findings of reappraisal impairment (Rowlands et al., 2019; Salas et al., 2014), by 
investigating performance across both personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks, and with a 
larger sample (Analysed under the sub-heading ‘How ABI affects reappraisal’). A further 
extension of previous work (Rowlands et al., 2019) was the investigation of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying reappraisal, this time across two tasks (Analysed under the sub-heading 
‘Cognitive mechanisms of reappraisal’). Finally, the study aimed to investigate whether 
performance on both tasks correlated with an established reappraisal questionnaire (Gullone & 
Taffe, 2012). This was to provide a measure of the validity of both personal and impersonal 




Fifty five participants with ABI and 35 healthy control participants were included in the 
study (N = 90)1. There were no significant differences in age or education between groups (see 
Table 1). Those with brain injury were prospectively recruited from a community outpatient 
rehabilitation service, the North Wales Brain Injury Service (NWBIS), Betsi Cadwaladr 
University Health Board (n = 39), and a small proportion recruited though Headway branches in 
North Wales (n = 12), and a rehabilitation day service, the Headforward Centre (n = 4). 
Inclusion criteria included the presence of a confirmed ABI (as per NWBIS criteria, Coetzer, 
Vaughan, Roberts, & Rafal, 2003), a minimum of nine months since time of injury, and language 
abilities persevered to a level sufficient enough to complete the tasks (as judged by service staff). 
Exclusion criteria included being unable to give informed consent, the presence of a psychiatric 
disorder in need of acute care, a neurodegenerative or neurodevelopmental disorder. Healthy 





This task was adapted from previous studies of reappraisal (Lench, et al., 2011, for a 
review; Lieberman, Inagaki, Tabibnia, & Crockett, 2011; McRae et al., 2012; Salas et al., 2014). 
1 51 of these participants (57%) were included in Rowlands et al (2019), however this previous study investigated 
reappraisal in ABI across discrete emotions, and thus included different, non-overlapping research questions. 
Tasks were carried out on a 13 inch laptop, providing step by step written instructions, to avoid 
memory bias. The task began with instructions, and two practice trials. Participants were then 
shown eight images from the IAPS, one at a time. Participants were required to verbally indicate 
the intensity of their emotional response to each image, on a zero to 10 scale. Following a written 
cue (‘Think aloud about the positive sides. Try to be quick’), participants were required to 
verbally generate as many reappraisals as possible, as quickly as possible, before indicating 
emotional intensity again. See Figure 1 for visual representation of one trial. 
[ Figure 1 Here ]
The images depicted a range of negative situations such as accidents, illness, and 
pollution, and evoked similar levels of valence and arousal. The mean of all sets of images 
indicated negative valence (M = 2.90, SD = 0.72), and moderate arousal (M = 5.33, SD = 0.52), 
as reported in the IAPS database (where valence is reported on a 1 – 9 scale from extreme 
negative to extreme positive, and where arousal is reported on a 1 – 9 scale from low to high). 
See Appendix A for task instruction. 
Personal reappraisal task
For the personal reappraisal task (Affective Story Recall Reappraisal, ASRR; Rowlands 
et al., 2019) participants were presented with emotion words one at a time (i.e. ‘sad’, ‘scared’, 
‘angry’, ‘neutral’, ‘sad’, ‘scared’, ‘angry’, ‘neutral’), and were required to describe a personal 
event from memory which evoked a congruent emotion for each emotion word. Participants then 
indicated emotional intensity on a zero to 10 scale, before generating as many positive sides as 
they could, as quickly as they could. Following this, they rated emotional intensity again. The 
negative emotions (‘sad’, ‘scared’, and ‘angry’) involved the down-regulation of emotional 
intensity via reappraisal. The ‘neutral’ condition involved the up-regulation of low-intensity 
neutral events into higher-intensity positive ratings. All emotion words appeared twice, resulting 
in eight trials, and the participant was required to recall a different event for each emotion word. 
See Figure 2 for visual representation of one trial. Task instructions are presented in Appendix A 
(supplementary material). 
[ Figure 2 Here ]
Given the wide range of cognitive abilities within the ABI population, a standardised 
exposure time was inappropriate. Participants, therefore, described their stories (personal task) 
and looked at the IAPS pictures (impersonal task) for as long as they felt necessary, but not 
exceeding three minutes. To avoid bias, participants were not instructed on the content of 
recalled stories, only that their story must evoke the instructed emotion for that trial. Both sets of 
stimuli were, therefore, not fully matched. However, the images in the impersonal task evoked a 
range of emotions, and for the personal task the scores across all discrete emotion trials were 
averaged, thus giving a ‘composite’ score for a range of emotions. Notably, both tasks present a 
trade-off, where impersonal IAPS stimuli allow for high experimenter control at the cost of 
ecological validity, and the personal task presents higher salience and ecological validity at the 
cost of loss of experimenter control. The validity of both reappraisal tasks was investigated in the 
present study (see results sub-heading ‘Reappraisal tasks and self-report’). 
Emotion regulation questionnaire 
The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (adapted for children and adolescents) (ERQ-CA) 
(Gullone & Taffe, 2012) measures self-reported use of reappraisal in daily life and is based upon 
the original and well-established Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). The 
adapted version was chosen because of the simplified language. The ERQ-CA includes 6 items 
measuring reappraisal, scored on a 7-point Likert scale. The ERQ-CA has sound internal 
consistency ( = .86) and validity. 
Cognitive control tasks 
Working Memory was assessed using the Digit Span sub-task from the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale (WAIS IV) (Wechsler, 2008), an informative measure of this ability in 
individuals with ABI (Millis, Rosenthal, Novack, Sherer, et al., 2001). The full Digit Span sub-
task was used. This is because all dimensions of the sub-task are required to validly compute 
Scaled Scores for different age groups, and this was deemed necessary due to the wide range of 
participant age in the present sample (22 – 69 years). In addition, evidence suggests that the 
separate dimensions of Digit Span should be interpreted together (Bowden, Petrauskas, 
Bardenhagen, Meade, & Simpson, 2013; Twamley, Palmer, Jeste, Taylor, & Heaton, 2006). 
Inhibition was measured with the Hayling sentence completion task from the Hayling and 
Brixton tests (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), which reports sensitivity (Burgess & Shallice, 1997), 
and validity in a sample of people with ABI (Odhuba, van den Broek, & Johns, 2005). The 
overall Hayling score was used as a proxy of inhibition, as it includes the ‘error score’ and ‘time 
taken to respond’. It is reported to have higher ecological validity, and correlates more highly 
with the inhibition factor on the Dysexecutive questionnaire (Odhuba, Van Den Broek, & Johns, 
2005). 
Verbal Ability was measured using the Letter Fluency sub-task from the Delis-Kaplan 
Executive Function system (D-KEFS) (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001). This capacity has been 
shown to be one of the strongest predictors of cognitive control (Henry & Crawford, 2004).
Procedure
Ethical approval was granted by the Health Board and Bangor University. Participants 
were invited to take part, and assessments carried out at Bangor University, NWBIS, 
Headforward Centre, or participants’ homes. Following written informed consent, cognitive 
control tasks, reappraisal tasks, and the questionnaire were administered in random order, and 
completed in one session, with a short break half-way through. For the impersonal task, 
participants were randomly allocated to one set of eight images from the IAPS (Lang et al., 
2008), out of a possible five sets that were had similar average valence and arousal (See 
Appendix B). Participants were told that the aim of both reappraisal tasks was to produce as 
many positive sides (reappraisals) as possible, as quickly as possible. Both tasks were recorded 
and transcribed verbatim, and provided three measurements: reappraisal productivity (the total 
number of reappraisals produced), reappraisal difficulty (the average time taken to produce a 
first reappraisal), and reappraisal effectiveness (the average difference in emotional intensity 
ratings before, and after, reappraising). All measures were completed by the first author (LR) or 
trained research assistants. 
Data Reduction 
Three components of reappraisal were considered for each of the study aims: 1) 
Reappraisal productivity involved the total sum of reappraisals produced across each task; 2) 
Reappraisal difficulty was calculated by averaging the time taken to produce a first reappraisal 
across all the trials in each task, and 3) Reappraisal effectiveness consisted of the difference in 
score between the emotional intensity rated for each story recall (personal task) or IAPS picture 
(impersonal task) before and after reappraising, averaged across all trials. 
The initial emotional intensity rating to the stimuli was identified as a covariate, and 
included in all analyses. It was calculated by averaging the initial emotional intensity rating 
across all trials. The personal reappraisal task included a neutral-to-positive condition. The 
emotional intensity for those trials (in the personal task alone) were reverse scored, before being 
averaged with the other negative trials (i.e. so that a baseline intensity of 0 becomes 10). Finally, 
scaled scores were computed for the cognitive control tasks.
Data Analysis 
All analyses were carried out using the statistical software ‘R’ (R Core Team, 2019) with 
additional packages ‘Robustbase’, ‘Complmrob’, and ‘Stats’. The alpha level was not adjusted 
for multiple comparisons, because of the number of questions addressed and concern over loss of 
power (Cabin & Mitchell, 2000).
Personal versus impersonal reappraisal
In order to answer the primary research question, reappraisal productivity, difficulty, and 
effectiveness were compared for the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks using a series of 
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), with average initial emotional intensity ratings to stimuli as 
a covariate, thus correcting for variations in baseline intensity. This was done for both groups 
separately. 
How ABI affects reappraisal 
To compare reappraisal components between the HC and ABI group, a series of 
ANCOVA analyses were carried out. This was done for both the personal and impersonal tasks 
separately, again with initial emotional intensity ratings as a covariate. 
Cognitive control mechanisms of reappraisal
A series of forced entry robust multiple linear regression models were carried out, with 
‘MM’ method (Salibián-Barrera, Aelst, & Willems, 2008), and bootstrapped coefficients from 
999 bootstrapped samples (as a form of model validation) (Babyak, 2004; Efron, 2003). A robust 
regression approach was used because of the violation of the assumption of normally-distributed 
residuals in the present data, which would have brought into question the validity of the 
coefficients from a non-robust multiple linear regression. Separate regression models were 
carried out for each outcome variable (reappraisal productivity, difficulty, and effectiveness) for 
the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks. The predictor variables for each model consisted 
of the scaled scores for working memory (Digits, WAIS), inhibition (Hayling task), and verbal 
ability (D-KEFS). The average initial emotional intensity ratings were, again, controlled for by 
including these in the models as a covariate. This was done for each group separately, to gain 
insight into the potential relationships between neuropsychological mechanisms and reappraisal 
for each group. 
Reappraisal tasks and self-report 
As a final secondary aim, to investigate the validity and reliability of both reappraisal 
tasks, participant performance (i.e. reappraisal productivity, difficulty, and effectiveness for the 
personal and the impersonal task) was correlated with an established reappraisal questionnaire 
(ERQ-CA; Gullone & Taffe, 2012), using partial Pearson correlation analyses, correcting for 
initial emotional intensity ratings on the tasks. Analyses were carried out for both groups 
separately.
Results
As could be expected, the ABI and HC group differed in their level of cognitive 
functioning and self-report use of reappraisal in daily life. The ABI group performed worse 
across most components of reappraisal on both tasks. See Table 2 below for descriptive statistics. 
[ Table 2 Here ]
Personal versus impersonal reappraisal 
Performance on the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks were compared using 
ANCOVA for both the ABI and healthy control group separately, as this was deemed the most 
suitable analysis when controlling for the covariate.  
Acquired brain injury group
Participants with ABI produced more reappraisals (reappraisal productivity) on the 
personal task, and this was marginally significant, F(1,107) = 2.03, p = .047, r = .19, with a 
small effect size (see Figure 3). The ABI group took significantly less time to generate a first 
reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) on the personal task, compared to the impersonal reappraisal 
task, (F(1,107) = 9.24, p = .001, r = .29), with a medium effect size (see Figure 4). This group 
also reported significantly more effective reappraisals (reappraisal effectiveness) for the personal 
task (F(1,107) = 31.94, p < .001, r = .50), with a large effect size (see Figure 5). 
[Figure 3, 4 and 5 Here]
Healthy control group
The healthy control group produced significantly more reappraisals (reappraisal 
productivity) on the personal task, compared to the impersonal task, (F(1,67) = 5.40, p = .025, r 
= .27), with a small-to-medium effect size (see Figure 3). The time taken to produce a first 
reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) was similar for both tasks (F(1,67) = 1.64, p = .204, r = .15) 
(see Figure 4). The HC group also reported significantly more effective reappraisals (reappraisal 
effectiveness) for the personal task (F(1,67) = 6.90, p = .011, r = .31), with a medium effect size 
(see Figure 5). 
In summary, both groups reported more effective reappraisals (reappraisal effectiveness) 
on the personal task, compared to the impersonal stimuli2 (ABI group: p < .001; HC Group: p = 
.011). Participants from both groups produced a greater number of reappraisals (reappraisal 
productivity) on the personal task (ABI group: p = .047; HC Group: p = .025). Participants with 
ABI also took significantly less time to produce a reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) on the 
personal task (p = .001), a feature unique to this group. 
How ABI affects reappraisal 
Impersonal reappraisal task 
The results of the ANCOVA demonstrated that, on the impersonal reappraisal task, the 
ABI group took significantly longer to generate a first reappraisal (reappraisal productivity) 
compared to the healthy control group (F(1,86) = 37.00, p < .001, r = .54), with a large effect 
size (see Figure 4). Additionally, patients with ABI reported their reappraisals as significantly 
less effective (reappraisal effectiveness) on the impersonal reappraisal task compared to the 
healthy control group (F(1,86) = 11.97, p < .001, r = .34, with a medium effect size) (see Figure 
5), and produced significantly fewer reappraisals (reappraisal difficulty) (F(1,86) = 4.76, p = 
.032, r = .23, with a small effect size) (see Figure 3). 
Personal Reappraisal task 
On the personal reappraisal task, the ABI group took significantly longer to generate a 
first reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) (F(1,86) = 29.72, p < .001, r = .51, with a large effect 
size) (see Figure 4), and produced significantly fewer reappraisals (reappraisal productivity), 
compared to the healthy control group (F(1,86) = 5.49, p = .021, r = .24, with a small effect 
2 A series of partial Pearson correlations were carried (with initial emotional intensity as a covariate) to investigate 
the relationships between reappraisal effectiveness, and productivity and difficulty. The only correlations of note 
were between reappraisal effectiveness and productivity on the personal task for the ABI group (r = .47, p <.001), 
and the healthy control group (r = .33, p = .055), suggesting that a greater number of reappraisals is associated with 
greater change in emotional intensity for stimuli with personal relevance. 
size) (see Figure 3). Both groups rated their reappraisals to be similar in terms of effectiveness 
(reappraisal effectiveness) (F(1,86) = 2.64, p = .110, r = . 17, with a small effect size) (see 
Figure 5). 
Cognitive mechanisms of reappraisal
For results of all the regression analyses, see Table 3 and 4 (ABI group), and 5 and 6 (HC 
group). Only regression models with significant cognitive predictor variables are reported here.
ABI Group
Reappraisal Productivity. The regression model marginally improved prediction of that 
number of reappraisals generated (reappraisal productivity) (R2 = .18, F(4,54) = 9.21, p = .056) 
for the impersonal reappraisal task alone, and explained 18% of the variance. Within this model 
working memory was the single significant cognitive predictor variable (β = 0.52, p = .034).
Reappraisal Difficulty. The regression model for the personal task, did not significantly improve 
prediction of the time taken to generate a reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) (R2 = .13, F(4,54) = 
6.47, p = .166), however working memory was a single significant cognitive predictor within the 
model (β = -0.25, p = .041). The regression model on the impersonal task, did not significantly 
improve prediction of the time taken to generate a reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) (R2 = .16, 
F(4,54) = 7.74, p =.102), however inhibition was a single significant cognitive predictor (β = -
0.56, p = .020). 
Reappraisal Effectiveness. For performance on the personal task in the ABI group, the 
model explained 22% of the variance, and significantly improved prediction of reappraisal 
effectiveness (R2 = .22, F(4,54) = 14.35, p = .006). Inhibition scores were the only significant 
cognitive predictor variable within the model (β = 2.44, p = .037). On the impersonal task, 
inhibition was, again, a significant cognitive predictor of reappraisal effectiveness (β = 0.18, p = 
.041). The overall model was, however, non-significant (R2 = .15, F(5,54) = 8.51, p = .074), and 
explained 15% of the variance.  
[Table 3 and 4 here]
Healthy Control Group
Reappraisal Difficulty. For performance on the impersonal reappraisal task in the HC 
group, the model explained 28% of the variance, and significantly improved prediction of the 
time taken to generate a first reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) (R2 = .28, F(4,34) = 11.69, p = 
.019). Inhibition scores were the only significant cognitive predictor variable within the model (β 
= -0.74, p = .004).
[ Table 5 and 6 ]
To summarise, for those with brain injury, better working memory appears to predict a 
greater number of reappraisals (reappraisal productivity) generated on the impersonal task, and 
less time to generate a reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) on the personal task3. Better inhibition 
appears to be an important capacity for the rated effectiveness of reappraisals (reappraisal 
effectiveness) on both tasks, and less time to generate a reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) on the 
impersonal task alone. For the healthy control group, inhibition predicted less time to generate a 
reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) on the personal reappraisal task. As can be seen in Tables 3 – 
6, the covariate baseline emotional intensity was predictive of reappraisal effectiveness. This 
might be expected because reappraisal effectiveness is calculated from the baseline emotional 
intensity and the intensity after reappraising. Baseline emotional intensity was also positive 
predictive of reappraisal productivity on the impersonal task for the ABI group.
3 We acknowledge that the Digits Backwards dimension of the Digit Span (WAIS IV) is a true proxy of working memory. However, as 
previously mentioned, scaled scores (which correct for age effects) cannot be calculated from this dimension alone. Nonetheless, it is important to 
acknowledge that with a re-analysis with the Digits Backwards dimension as a cognitive predictor variable, these effects were lost (Impersonal 
task: reappraisal productivity (β = 0.28, p = 141); Personal task: reappraisal difficulty (β = -0.18, p = .166)
Reappraisal tasks and self-report 
A series of partial Pearson correlations analyses were carried out, to investigate the 
relationships between performance on both tasks, with self-report use of reappraisal on the ERQ-
CA. For full correlation results, see Table 7. Only significant relationships are reported here.
[ Table 7 Here ]
ABI Group
Self-report use of reappraisal on the ERQ-CA showed a significant moderate positive 
correlation with reported reappraisal effectiveness (r = .56, p < .001), a significant moderate 
positive correlation with the total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal productivity) (r = 
.41, p = .002), and a significant moderate negative correlation with the time taken to generate a 
first reappraisal (reappraisal difficulty) (r = -.34, p = .011), on the personal reappraisal task. On 
the impersonal reappraisal task, ERQ-CA scores demonstrated a significant moderate positive 
correlation with the total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal productivity) (r = .30, p = 
.026).
Healthy Control Group
For the HC group, the general picture is much less informative. Participants’ self-report 
use of reappraisal on the ERQ-CA showed a significant moderate positive correlation with the 
total number of reappraisals produced (reappraisal productivity) on the impersonal task alone (r 
= .40, p = .018). The ERQ-CA was not notably related to any other component of reappraisal 
across either task. 
Discussion
The present study aimed, particularly, to gain further insight into how reappraisal 
performance may vary depending on the personal relevance of task stimuli. Secondary aims were 
to extend previous findings regarding reappraisal impairment in people with ABI, the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms of this ER strategy, and finally, to investigate correlations between task 
performance and self-report use of reappraisal, as a measure of task validity. 
Personal versus impersonal reappraisal 
An important conclusion of the present study is that both groups of participants generated 
more reappraisals, and more effective reappraisals, to their own recalled memories. That is, 
generating new meanings, and successfully changing emotional intensity, appeared to be less 
difficult when reappraising their own recalled events, in particular for the ABI group. These 
findings suggest that a reappraisal task with personally salient emotional memories as the 
elicitation component (as in previous studies in neurotypical individuals, Holland & Kensinger, 
2013; Speed et al., 2017) can be a highly successful tool to measure ER. A limitation of the 
previous literature, however, was the absence of a direct comparison with a standardised, 
impersonal, external elicitation measure. The findings of the present study suggest that personal 
salience may facilitate the reappraisal process. 
A key theme of the finding is the potential importance of context (Aldao, 2013). The high 
ecological validity of the personal reappraisal task likely reflects how reappraisal plays out in 
more real-life contexts. That is, reappraising emotions based on real, and sometimes powerful, 
events is a complex and dynamic process (Kalisch, 2009). Better generation and more effective 
reappraisal for such events might mirror how regulatory strategies unfold in response to higher 
and more complex situational demands (c.f. the regulatory flexibility literature; Bonanno & 
Burton, 2013; Burton & Bonanno, 2016). 
In particular, reappraisal is thought to be more effective in situations that are 
uncontrollable, where the person can only regulate the self (Troy, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2013). 
These were the types of events frequently recalled on the personal task (common themes include 
illness, death, relationships). Such judgements require adequate situational information (context), 
which is minimal in impersonal stimuli, such as IAPS pictures. Ambiguity and a lack of 
information seems likely to decrease situational demands, and leaves individuals with little sense 
of agency to regulate the self. 
Given the absence of adequate information on the impersonal task, participants might be 
required to think hypothetically about how abstract ideas can change the emotional outcome of 
the picture’s content (Salas et al., 2013). Such a skill surely requires abstract reasoning, and 
verbal ability, both impairments which have been shown to compromise reappraisal generation 
(for a detailed description see Salas et al., 2013). If the impersonal reappraisal task relies more 
heavily on more abstract aspects of cognition, it is possible that differences in cognitive ability 
contribute to the lower effectiveness of reappraisals, and would explain why the ABI group alone 
took longer to generate a reappraisal on the impersonal task. This may be particularly marked in 
dysexecutive patients, who often struggle with disengagement from immediate experience and 
manipulating thoughts (Gomez Beldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, et al., 2005; Salas et al., 
2012). Such inflexibility, and lack of a reflective stance, may be more pronounced when 
emotions have been generated externally. However, when emotions are self-generated through 
memory recall, dysexecutive patients may be less influenced by perceptual aspects of stimuli and 
therefore able to utilise the personal content and relevance to manipulate ideas. Appendix C 
demonstrates examples of reappraisals across both tasks, which reflect these possible 
explanations. 
How ABI affects reappraisal 
If reappraisal is a two-stage process (Kalisch, 2009), the present study suggests that 
having a brain injury especially compromises the early, generative, stage, regardless of the type 
of stimulus that is reappraised. This provides further support to previous findings, which 
demonstrated that a brain injury can compromise the capacity to generate reappraisals, and to do 
so quickly (Rowlands et al., 2019). 
For the ABI group, reappraisal effectiveness seemed to be influenced by the nature of the 
reappraisal task. That is, when reappraising impersonal stimuli, the ABI group reported 
significantly poorer reappraisal effectiveness compared to healthy controls, but this difference 
was not present for the personal task. The observation that reappraisal effectiveness was similar 
to healthy controls on the personal task, is consistent with previous findings that patients with 
brain injury were able to down-regulate negative emotions at similar levels to a healthy control 
group (Rowlands et al., 2019). A likely explanation for the difference on the impersonal task is 
that those with impaired cognitive control may experience more difficulties for impersonal or 
abstract situations. 
The neglected role of context 
This study shows that there is an important distinction between reappraisal for personal 
and impersonal material, especially for the ABI group. It appears that when reappraising material 
that is relevant to the self, spontaneous generation of information (or idea generation) is easier. 
Participants are, therefore, able to use this contextual information to build more effective 
reinterpretations, and more quickly. Impersonal (i.e. external) stimuli may present an additional 
challenge, because there is insufficient contextual information to build reappraisals. 
The notion that contextual information is important is consistent with a developing line of 
research, which suggests that context effects are central in ER (Aldao, 2013, for a review; 
Bonanno & Burton, 2013). For example, in contexts where stressful situations can be controlled, 
the use of reappraisal is considered maladaptive (Troy, Shallcross & Mauss, 2013). Additionally, 
the adaptiveness of a reappraisal might rely on the realism of the information used to build the 
new meanings (Aldao, 2013; Gross 1998; van’t Wout, Chang, & Sanfey, 2010). It is, therefore, 
possible that contextual information is critical to building positive reinterpretations, that are then 
accepted as realistic. 
This idea can be seen anecdotally in the example below, of a participant in the ABI 
group.
Impersonal task (Sad Girls picture): “We don’t know what’s happened to them. In my mind, the 
three of them are crying like something big has happened. We don’t know, maybe someone has 
been hurt. I look on the dark side, but when I try not to look on the dark side, maybe it’s not a 
terrible thing but a friend has gone to work in another country and they are just missing the 
friend. We just don’t know. Because I don’t know I think it is like the dark side, so [how I feel] 
doesn’t change”. 
Personal task (Scared when joined a community brain injury group): “Positive side is that now I 
enjoy going. And if I get invited to other places now, I will go.  I enjoy taking part in all the 
activities, and meeting new people. It’s comforting to meet people who have gone through the 
same as you, and they know what you’ve been through and can help. It’s nice to be with people 
that listen to you there too, like the volunteers and that”. 
In the impersonal task, the participant attempted to seek out contextual information to 
build reappraisals, but then rejects them because they were apparently not credible. In contrast, 
when faced with a personal story, where there is an abundance of information to build 
reappraisals, they were more easily able to accept the new meaning as credible. It seems, 
therefore, that being able to generate a reappraisal is not always enough, participants have to 
then accept the reappraisal in order for it to successfully alter emotional responses. Given the 
absence of contextual information in impersonal stimuli, reappraisals may be harder to accept, 
and thus do not change the intensity of emotions to the same extent. 
Cognitive mechanisms of reappraisal
The present study found associations between several cognitive control capacities and 
components of reappraisal. While it appears that cognitive capacities are important for 
reappraisal, their link to specific reappraisal components seems to depend on both the nature of 
the stimuli and the participant group. The most notable finding was that, for those with ABI, 
inhibition appeared to be particularly important for a reappraisal’s effectiveness at changing 
emotional intensity, regardless of stimuli. This is comparable to previous studies in 
neurologically heathy participants (Buhle et al., 2014, for meta-analysis). Inhibition was also 
predictive of the time taken to generate a reappraisal on the impersonal task (for the ABI group) 
and the personal task (HC group). This is a similar finding to a previous study of reappraisal in 
ABI (Salas et al., 2014), and suggests that being able to effectively inhibit the initial appraisal is 
a necessary step to generate an alternative interpretation quickly. 
Working memory appeared to be important for some elements of reappraisal for the ABI 
group alone. Specifically, better working memory appeared to support quicker generation of 
reappraisals for the personal task, and seemed important for generating a greater number of 
reappraisals on the impersonal task. This extends well-established findings of working memory 
and reappraisal (Hendricks & Buchanan, 2016; Jasielska, Kaczmarek, Brońska, Dominiak et al., 
2017; McRae et al., 2012; Rowlands et al., 2019). It is, somewhat, surprising that working 
memory was not found to be predictive of the number of reappraisals produced on the personal 
task, given the previous findings using that same task (Rowlands et al., 2019). 
These findings are, indeed, very complex, but what is especially noteworthy is that 
cognitive control appears to be more predictive of reappraisal performance for the ABI group, 
and for the impersonal stimuli. This could be because such capacities might be required to a 
much greater extent for ambiguous situations (e.g. IAPS pictures), where there is not enough 
contextual information to draw from. Additionally, the highly varied nature of cognitive ability 
in the ABI group may have allowed the detection of these effects, whereas the majority of 
participants in the healthy control group scored within a restricted ‘average’ range for cognitive 
control. 
Reappraisal tasks and self-report
The strong associations between task performance on the personal task, and the self-
report use of reappraisal on an established questionnaire (ERQ-CA), suggest that the personal 
task is especially reliable and appropriate for measuring this ER strategy in participants with 
brain injury, and has strong ecological validity. Such associations were not found for the healthy 
control group. This may be related to the narrower range of reappraisal performance in this 
group, or a discrepancy between habitual use of reappraisal in daily life, and what people are 
capable of doing when they are instructed in laboratory tasks (McRae et al., 2012; Troy, 
Wilhelm, Shallcross, & Mauss, 2010; Weber, Assunção, Martin, Westmeyer, & Geisler, 2014). 
Such tasks focus exclusively on the ‘implementation stage’ of ER, and in daily life people would 
have to first choose reappraisal as the ER strategy to be implemented (i.e. the ‘selection stage’) 
(McRae & Gross, 2020; Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, Radu, et al., 2014). It is also possible that people 
may report frequent use of reappraisal in their lives, but do so rather unsuccessfully (Perchtold, 
Papousek, Fink, Weber, et al., 2019). The present study’s findings provide support that the 
number of reappraisals generated on the impersonal task is somewhat associated with the 
validated questionnaire, regardless of group. 
A model of reappraisal: context and cognition
These findings support the idea that reappraisal is a dynamic two-stage process, 
consisting of early and late phases (Kalisch, 2009; Paret, Brenninkmeyer, Yuen, Gartmann, et al., 
2011). Expanding on the Implementation-Maintenance model (Kalisch, 2009), Salas and 
colleagues (2014) suggested that the early phase, reappraisal generation, requires inhibition as a 
first step (to disengage from the initial appraisal), and verbal ability as a process to facilitate the 
generation of new meanings. As discussed above, contextual information may facilitate the 
generative process further. 
An adapted two-stage model of reappraisal is proposed here, considering results from the 
present study and previous findings (Kalisch, 2009; McRae et al., 2012; Ochsner, Silvers, & 
Buhle, 2012; Paret et al., 2011; Rowlands et al., 2019; Salas et al., 2013; Salas et al., 2014). See 
Figure 6. In the first phase, reappraisal generation, inhibition is required to disengage from the 
initial appraisal (1). If successful, the initial meaning and goal of reappraising is kept in mind - 
supported by working memory (2), and verbal ability and working memory are required to 
generate re-interpretations of the initial meaning (3). 
If the first phase is successful, the second phase of reappraisal maintenance is entered. 
Here, working memory keeps track of the new appraisal (4), protecting it from the automatic 
appraisal. It is likely that monitoring is then important to track the reappraisal’s success, and 
modify if necessary (5). This process seems mediated by the available contextual information, 
including the generation and maintenance components. In the absence of contextual information 
(e.g. impersonal stimuli), participants depend on cognitive control capacities to a higher degree, 
and draw upon reasoning skills to translate abstract ideas into reappraisals. The reappraisal’s 
success then, in large part, relies on how well the automatic appraisal has been inhibited in the 
first phase.
[ Figure 6 Here ]
Implications and Future Directions 
The present study’s findings are important for neuropsychological rehabilitation in two 
ways. Firstly, by demonstrating that patients with ABI might be vulnerable to reappraisal 
impairment, in particular in ambiguous situations, or ones in which they must act quickly. This 
opens the possibility of facilitating the process by changing environmental demands (time) or 
providing support (contextual information). Secondly, it suggests that, for those with ABI, a 
cognitively effortful strategy may not be the best choice to modulate feelings. For example, there 
is evidence to suggest that strategies such as attentional deployment (Isaacowitz, Toner, & 
Neupert, 2009; Sheppes, Brady, & Samson, 2014) or situation selection (Webb, Lindquist, Jones, 
et al., 2018) might be more appropriate for those low in cognitive resources. 
Despite this contribution, the present study has some limitations. One is related to the 
mixed, and highly varied, sample of participants with ABI. However, this is also positive in that 
it is reflective of the clinical population. Another issue is that the measure of reappraisal 
effectiveness was dependant on self-report changes in emotional intensity, and therefore may 
have been vulnerable to experimenter demands. It is important to note, however, that self-report 
is correlated with physiology during reappraisal (Troy et al., 2010). Finally, it is worthwhile to 
mention that the sample size was relatively small for the multiple regression analyses, in 
particular for the HC group. It is, therefore, possible that the coefficients are unstable, and may 
not generalise to other samples. 
Conclusion
The findings of the present study enhance the understanding of which tools might be 
most appropriate to capture elements of reappraisal, and in particular for neurological 
populations. It is suggested that a personal task (such as the ASRR) may be technically superior 
to impersonal stimuli, and cognitively less effortful because it is facilitated by context. However, 
reappraisal remains a difficult strategy for patients, even when facilitated by personal context. 
Considered together, the use of a personally-salient task as an assessment tool is highly 
recommended, in particular for people with ABI. It can also be extended into the realm of 
intervention, and potentially used as a therapeutic tool, given its salience. 
Sample size calculation
Given the specialised nature of the ABI sample, the size was determined by the highest possible 
number of recruited patients within the current restraints of the study.
Acknowledgements
This study was supported by EU Social Fund through the Welsh Government. We would like to 
thank all the participants for contributing to this work, and the research assistants involved in the 
study. 
References 
Aldao, A. (2013). The future of emotion regulation research: Capturing context. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 8(2), 155-172. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691612459518
Andelic, N., Hammergren, N., Bautz‐Holter, E., Sveen, U., Brunborg, C., & Røe, C. (2009). Functional 
outcome and health‐related quality of life 10 years after moderate‐to‐severe traumatic brain 
injury. Acta Neurologica Scandinavica, 120(1), 16-23. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1600-
0404.2008.01116.x
Babyak, M. A. (2004). What you see may not be what you get: a brief, nontechnical introduction to 
overfitting in regression-type models. Psychosomatic medicine, 66(3), 411-421. 
Beer, J. S., & Lombardo, M. V. (2007). Insights into emotion regulation from neuropsychology. In J. J., 
Gross (Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation, (pp. 69-86), New York: The Guilford Press.
Bonanno, G. A., & Burton, C. L. (2013). Regulatory flexibility: An individual differences perspective on 
coping and emotion regulation. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 8(6), 591-612. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691613504116
Bornhofen, C., & Mcdonald, S. (2008). Emotion perception deficits following traumatic brain injury: A 
review of the evidence and rationale for intervention. Journal of the International 
Neuropsychological Society, 14(4), 511-525. DOI:  https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617708080703
Bowden, S. C., Petrauskas, V. M., Bardenhagen, F. J., Meade, C. E., & Simpson, L. C. (2013). 
Exploring the dimensionality of digit span. Assessment, 20(2), 188-198. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191112457016
Bramlett, H. M., & Dietrich, W. D. (2015). Long-term consequences of traumatic brain injury: current 
status of potential mechanisms of injury and neurological outcomes. Journal of 
neurotrauma, 32(23), 1834-1848. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1089/neu.2014.3352
Buhle, J. T., Silvers, J. A., Wager, T. D., Lopez, R., Onyemekwu, C., Kober, H., ... & Ochsner, K. N. 
(2014). Cognitive reappraisal of emotion: a meta-analysis of human neuroimaging 
studies. Cerebral cortex, 24(11), 2981-2990. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/cercor/bht154
Burgess, P. W., & Shallice, T. (1997). The Hayling and Brixton Tests. Thurston, Suffolk: Thames Valley 
Test Company.
Burton, C. L., & Bonanno, G. A. (2016). Regulatory flexibility and its role in adaptation to aversive 
events throughout the lifespan. In A. D. Ong & C. E. Löckenhoff (Eds.), Bronfenbrenner series 
on the ecology of human development. Emotion, aging, and health (pp. 71-94). Washington, DC, 
US: American Psychological Association. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/14857-005
Cabin, R. J., & Mitchell, R. J. (2000). To Bonferroni or not to Bonferroni: when and how are the 
questions. Bulletin of the Ecological Society of America, 81(3), 246-248.
Chirico, A., Cipresso, P., & Gaggioli, A. (2018). Psychophysiological Specificity of Four Basic 
Emotions Through Autobiographical Recall and Videos. In International Symposium on 
Pervasive Computing Paradigms for Mental Health (pp. 1-8). Springer, Cham. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-01093-5_1
Coetzer, B. R., Vaughan, F. L., Roberts, C. B., & Rafal, R. (2003). The development of a holistic, 
community based neurorehabilitation service in a rural area. Journal of Cognitive 
Rehabilitation, 21(1), 4-15.
Corrigan, J. D., Selassie, A. W., & Orman, J. A. L. (2010). The epidemiology of traumatic brain 
injury. The Journal of head trauma rehabilitation, 25(2), 72-80. DOI: 
10.1097/HTR.0b013e3181ccc8b4
De Sousa, A., McDonald, S., & Rushby, J. (2012). Changes in emotional empathy, affective 
responsivity, and behavior following severe traumatic brain injury. Journal of Clinical and 
Experimental Neuropsychology, 34(6), 606-623. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13803395.2012.667067
Delis, D. C., Kaplan, E., & Kramer, J. H. (2001). Delis-Kaplan Executive function system: examiners 
manual. Psychological Corporation.
Diaz, A. P., Schwarzbold, M. L., Thais, M. E., Hohl, A., Bertotti, M. M., Schmoeller, R., ... & Walz, R. 
(2012). Psychiatric disorders and health-related quality of life after severe traumatic brain injury: 
a prospective study. Journal of Neurotrauma, 29(6), 1029-1037.
Dijkers, M. P. (2004). Quality of life after traumatic brain injury: a review of research approaches and 
findings. Archives of physical medicine and rehabilitation, 85, 21-35. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apmr.2003.08.119
Efron, B. (2003). Second thoughts on the bootstrap. Statistical Science, 18(2), 135-140. DOI: 
doi:10.1214/ss/1063994968
Ergh, T. C., Rapport, L. J., Coleman, R. D., & Hanks, R. A. (2002). Predictors of caregiver and family 
functioning following traumatic brain injury: Social support moderates caregiver distress. The 
Journal of head trauma rehabilitation, 17(2), 155-174.
Falquez, R., Couto, B., Ibanez, A., Freitag, M. T., Berger, M., Arens, E. A., ... & Barnow, S. (2014). 
Detaching from the negative by reappraisal: the role of right superior frontal gyrus 
(BA9/32). Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 8, 165. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00165
Goldin, P. R., Manber-Ball, T., Werner, K., Heimberg, R., & Gross, J. J. (2009). Neural mechanisms of 
cognitive reappraisal of negative self-beliefs in social anxiety disorder. Biological 
psychiatry, 66(12), 1091-1099. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.07.014 
Goldin, P. R., McRae, K., Ramel, W., & Gross, J. J. (2008). The neural bases of emotion regulation: 
reappraisal and suppression of negative emotion. Biological psychiatry, 63(6), 577-586. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2007.05.031
Gomez Beldarrain, M. G., Garcia-Monco, J. C., Astigarraga, E., Gonzalez, A., & Grafman, J. (2005). 
Only spontaneous counterfactual thinking is impaired in patients with prefrontal cortex 
lesions. Cognitive Brain Research, 24(3), 723-726.
Gross, J. J. (1998). Antecedent- and response-focused emotion regulation: Divergent consequences for 
experience, expression, and physiology. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 234-
237. DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348
Gross, J. J. (2013). Emotion regulation: Conceptual and empirical foundations. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), 
Handbook of emotion regulation (pp.3-21). New York: Guilford Press.
Gross, J. J. (2015). Emotion regulation: Current status and future prospects. Psychological 
Inquiry, 26(1), 1-26. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1047840X.2014.940781
Gross, J. J., & John, O. P. (2003). Individual differences in two emotion regulation processes: 
implications for affect, relationships, and well-being. Journal of personality and social 
psychology, 85(2), 348. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.85.2.348
Gross, J. J., & Thompson, R. A. (2007). Emotion regulation: Conceptual foundations. In J. J. Gross 
(Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp.3-24). New York: Guilford Press. 
Gullone, E., & Taffe, J. (2012). The Emotion Regulation Questionnaire for Children and Adolescents 
(ERQ–CA): A psychometric evaluation. Psychological assessment, 24(2), 409.
Hendricks, M. A., & Buchanan, T. W. (2016). Individual differences in cognitive control processes and 
their relationship to emotion regulation. Cognition and Emotion, 30(5), 912-924. DOI 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2015.1032893
Henry, J. D., & Crawford, J. R. (2004). A meta-analytic review of verbal fluency performance in 
patients with traumatic brain injury. Neuropsychology, 18(4), 621. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0894-4105.18.4.621
Hesdorffer, D. C., Rauch, S. L., & Tamminga, C. A. (2009). Long-term psychiatric outcomes following 
traumatic brain injury: a review of the literature. The Journal of head trauma 
rehabilitation, 24(6), 452-459. DOI: 10.1097/HTR.0b013e3181c133fd 
Holland, A. C., & Kensinger, E. A. (2013). The neural correlates of cognitive reappraisal during 
emotional autobiographical memory recall. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 25(1), 87-108. 
Hu, T., Zhang, D., Wang, J., Mistry, R., Ran, G., & Wang, X. (2014). Relation between emotion 
regulation and mental health: a meta-analysis review. Psychological reports, 114(2), 341-362. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2466/03.20.PR0.114k22w4
Isaacowitz, D. M., Toner, K., & Neupert, S. D. (2009). Use of gaze for real-time mood regulation: 
Effects of age and attentional functioning. Psychology and Aging, 24(4), 989-994. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0017706
Jasielska, A., Kaczmarek, L., Brońska, A., Dominiak, M., Niemier, K., Patalas, D., ... & Tomczak, M. 
(2017). The relationship between working memory and emotion regulation strategies. Roczniki 
Psychologiczne/Annals of Psychology, 18(4), 567-578.
Joormann, J., & Gotlib, I. H. (2010). Emotion regulation in depression: relation to cognitive 
inhibition. Cognition and Emotion, 24(2), 281-298. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930903407948
Kalisch, R. (2009). The functional neuroanatomy of reappraisal: time matters. Neuroscience & 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 33(8), 1215-1226. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.06.003
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1997). International affective picture system (IAPS): 
Technical manual and affective ratings. NIMH Center for the Study of Emotion and Attention, 1, 
39-58.
Lench, H. C., Flores, S. A., & Bench, S. W. (2011). Discrete emotions predict changes in cognition, 
judgment, experience, behavior, and physiology: a meta-analysis of experimental emotion 
elicitations. Psychological bulletin, 137(5), 834.
Levenson, R. W. (2007). Emotion elicitation with neurological patient. In C. James and J. Allen (Eds.), 
The Handbook of Emotion Elicitation and Assessment, (pp. 158-168), Cambridge: University 
Press.
Levenson, R. W., Ascher, E. A., Goodkind, M. S., McCarthy, M. E., Sturm, V. E., & Werner, K. H. 
(2008) Laboratory testing of emotion and frontal cortex. In G. Goldenberg and B. Miller 
(Eds.), Handbook of Clinical Neuropsychology and Behavioural Neurology, (pp. 489 – 498). 
New York: Elsevier. 
Lewis, E. J., Yoon, K. L., & Joormann, J. (2018). Emotion regulation and biological stress responding: 
associations with worry, rumination, and reappraisal. Cognition and Emotion, 32(7), 1487-1498. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2017.1310088
Lieberman, M. D., Inagaki, T. K., Tabibnia, G., & Crockett, M. J. (2011). Subjective responses to 
emotional stimuli during labeling, reappraisal, and distraction. Emotion, 11(3), 468. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0023503
Lobbestael, J., Arntz, A., & Wiers, R. W. (2008). How to push someone's buttons: A comparison of four 
anger-induction methods. Cognition & Emotion, 22(2), 353-373. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930701438285
McRae, K., & Gross, J. J. (2020). Emotion regulation. Emotion, 20(1), 1-9. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/emo0000703
Millis, S. R., Rosenthal, M., Novack, T. A., Sherer, M., Nick, T. G., Kreutzer, J. S., ... & Ricker, J. H. 
(2001). Long-term neuropsychological outcome after traumatic brain injury. The Journal of head 
trauma rehabilitation, 16(4), 343-355.
Ochsner, K. N., & Gross, J. J. (2005). The cognitive control of emotion. Trends in cognitive 
sciences, 9(5), 242-249. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2005.03.010
Ochsner, K. N., Silvers, J. A., & Buhle, J. T. (2012). Functional imaging studies of emotion regulation: a 
synthetic review and evolving model of the cognitive control of emotion. Annals of the New York 
Academy of Sciences, 1251, E1. DOI: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2012.06751.x
Odhuba, R. A., Van Den Broek, M. D., & Johns, L. C. (2005). Ecological validity of measures of 
executive functioning. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44(2), 269-278. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466505X29431
Paret, C., Brenninkmeyer, J., Meyer, B., Yuen, K. S., Gartmann, N., Mechias, M. L., & Kalisch, R. 
(2011). A test for the implementation–maintenance model of reappraisal. Frontiers in 
Psychology, 2, 216. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00216 
Perchtold, C. M., Papousek, I., Fink, A., Weber, H., Rominger, C., & Weiss, E. M. (2019). Gender 
differences in generating cognitive reappraisals for threatening situations: Reappraisal capacity 
shields against depressive symptoms in men, but not women. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 553. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00553
Prigatano, G. P., & Pribram, K. H. (1982). Perception and memory of facial affect following brain 
injury. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 54(3), 859-869. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2466/pms.1982.54.3.859
Prkachin, K. M., Williams-Avery, R. M., Zwaal, C., & Mills, D. E. (1999). Cardiovascular changes 
during induced emotion: An application of Lang's theory of emotional imagery. Journal of 
Psychosomatic Research, 47(3), 255-267. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-3999(99)00036-7
Rowlands, L., Coetzer, R., & Turnbull, O. H. (2019). Good things better? Reappraisal and discrete 
emotions in acquired brain injury. Neuropsychological rehabilitation, 1-29. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2019.1620788
Salas Riquelme, C. E., Turnbull, O. H., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Reappraisal generation after acquired 
brain damage: The role of laterality and cognitive control. Frontiers in Psychology, 5, 242. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00242
Salas, C. E., Gross, J. J., & Turnbull, O. H. (2019). Using the process model to understand emotion 
regulation changes after brain injury. Psychology & Neuroscience, 12(4), 430. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pne0000174
Salas, C. E., Gross, J. J., Rafal, R. D., Viñas-Guasch, N., & Turnbull, O. H. (2013). Concrete behaviour 
and reappraisal deficits after a left frontal stroke: a case study. Neuropsychological 
rehabilitation, 23(4), 467-500. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09602011.2013.784709
Salas, C. E., Radovic, D., & Turnbull, O. H. (2012). Inside-out: Comparing internally generated and 
externally generated basic emotions. Emotion, 12(3), 568. DOI: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0025811
Salas, C. E., Radovic, D., Castro, O., & Turnbull, O. H. (2015). Internally and externally generated 
emotions in people with acquired brain injury: preservation of emotional experience after right 
hemisphere lesions. Frontiers in psychology, 6, 101.
Salibián-Barrera, M., Van Aelst, S., & Willems, G. (2008). Fast and robust bootstrap. Statistical 
Methods and Applications, 17(1), 41-71. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10260-007-0048-6
Sheppes, G., Brady, W. J., & Samson, A. C. (2014). In (visual) search for a new distraction: The 
efficiency of a novel attentional deployment versus semantic meaning regulation 
strategies. Frontiers in psychology, 5, 346. DOI: https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00346
Sheppes, G., Scheibe, S., Suri, G., Radu, P., Blechert, J., & Gross, J. J. (2014). Emotion regulation 
choice: A conceptual framework and supporting evidence. Journal of Experimental Psychology: 
General, 143(1), 163. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030831
Siedlecka, E., & Denson, T. F. (2019). Experimental methods for inducing basic emotions: A 
Qualitative review. Emotion Review, 11(1), 87-97. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073917749016
Silton, R. L., Kahrilas, I. J., Skymba, H. V., Smith, J., Bryant, F. B., & Heller, W. (2020). Regulating 
positive emotions: Implications for promoting well-being in individuals with 
depression. Emotion, 20(1), 93. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/emo0000675
Speed, B. C., Levinson, A. R., Gross, J. J., Kiosses, D. N., & Hajcak, G. (2017). Emotion regulation to 
idiographic stimuli: Testing the autobiographical emotion regulation task. Neuropsychologia. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.04.032
Tagliaferri, F., Compagnone, C., Korsic, M., Servadei, F., & Kraus, J. (2006). A systematic review of 
brain injury epidemiology in Europe. Acta neurochirurgica, 148(3), 255-268. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00701-005-0651-y  
Troy, A. S., Shallcross, A. J., & Mauss, I. B. (2013). A person-by-situation approach to emotion 
regulation: Cognitive reappraisal can either help or hurt, depending on the context. Psychological 
science, 24(12), 2505-2514. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797613496434
Troy, A. S., Wilhelm, F. H., Shallcross, A. J., & Mauss, I. B. (2010). Seeing the silver lining: cognitive 
reappraisal ability moderates the relationship between stress and depressive 
symptoms. Emotion, 10(6), 783. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020262
Turnbull, O. H., Evans, C. E., & Owen, V. (2005). Negative emotions and anosognosia. Cortex, 41(1), 
67-75. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0010-9452(08)70179-5
Twamley, E. W., Palmer, B. W., Jeste, D. V., Taylor, M. J., & Heaton, R. K. (2006). Transient and 
executive function working memory in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia research, 87(1-3), 185-190. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.schres.2006.04.013
van't Wout, M., Chang, L. J., & Sanfey, A. G. (2010). The influence of emotion regulation on social 
interactive decision-making. Emotion, 10(6), 815. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0020069
Webb, T. L., Lindquist, K. A., Jones, K., Avishai, A., & Sheeran, P. (2018). Situation selection is a 
particularly effective emotion regulation strategy for people who need help regulating their 
emotions. Cognition and Emotion, 32(2), 231-248. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2017.1295922
Weber, H., Loureiro de Assunção, V., Martin, C., Westmeyer, H., & Geisler, F. C. (2014). Reappraisal 
inventiveness: The ability to create different reappraisals of critical situations. Cognition & 
emotion, 28(2), 345-360.DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/02699931.2013.832152
Wechsler, D. (2008). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–Fourth Edition (WAIS–IV). San Antonio, TX: 
The Psychological Corporation.
Williams, C., & Wood, R. L. (2010). Alexithymia and emotional empathy following traumatic brain 
injury. Journal of clinical and experimental neuropsychology, 32(3), 259-267. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/13803390902976940
Williams, W. H., & Evans, J. J. (2003). Brain injury and emotion: An overview to a special issue on 
biopsychosocial approaches in neurorehabilitation. Neuropsychological rehabilitation, 13(1-2), 
1-11.
Zhang, X., Yu, H. W., & Barrett, L. F. (2014). How does this make you feel? A comparison of four 
affect induction procedures. Frontiers in psychology, 5, 689. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00689
Figure 1. Figure demonstrating one trial in the impersonal reappraisal task (one IAPS picture 
out of a set of eight IAPS images). 
Figure 2. Figure demonstrating one trial in the personal reappraisal task (one trial in the sad 
condition out of eight total trials [Sad, Scared, Angry, Neutral, Sad, Scared, Angry, Neutral]). 
From Rowlands et al., 2019
Figure 3. Graph demonstrating mean reappraisal productivity scores for both the ABI and 
healthy control group, on the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks. Significance *** <.001, 
** < .01, * < .05. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
Figure 4. Graph demonstrating mean reappraisal difficulty (seconds) for both the ABI and 
healthy control group, on the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks. Significance *** <.001, 
** < .01, * < .05. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
Figure 5. Graph demonstrating mean reappraisal effectiveness for both the ABI and healthy 
control group, on the personal and impersonal reappraisal tasks. Significance *** <.001, ** < 
.01, * < .05. Error bars represent 95% CI. 
Figure 6. A proposed model of reappraisal. In the early reappraisal generation phase 1) the automatic 
appraisal is inhibited (inhibition), 2) the initial meaning and goal of reappraising is kept in mind 
(working memory), 3) new interpretations are generated (working memory and verbal ability). In the 
second phase, reappraisal maintenance, 4) the reappraisal is kept in mind and ‘shielded’ form the initial 
meaning. The reappraisals’ success is monitored and adapted if necessary (monitoring) (5). The process 
may be facilitated by the available contextual information. In the absence of such information, abstract 
ideas must be used to facilitate the generation of contesting mental representations (abstract reasoning).
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Figure 6. A proposed model of reappraisal. In the early reappraisal generation phase 1) the automatic 
appraisal is inhibited (inhibition), 2) the initial meaning and goal of reappraising is kept in mind (working 
memory), 3) new interpretations are generated (working memory and verbal ability). In the second phase, 
reappraisal maintenance, 4) the reappraisal is kept in mind and ‘shielded’ form the initial meaning. The 
reappraisals’ success is monitored and adapted if necessary (monitoring) (5). The process may be facilitated 
by the available contextual information. In the absence of such information, abstract ideas must be used to 
facilitate the generation of contesting mental representations (abstract reasoning).
Table 1. Demographic and injury information for both the ABI and HC group
Group Age
M   (SD)
Range
Education
M   (SD)
Range




ABI 46   (11.44)
22-67
13   (3.21)
10-20
M (n = 38)
F (n = 17)
7   (8.52)
9 months - 32
CVA (n = 20)
TBI (n = 28)
Encephalitis (n = 2) 
Tumour removal (n = 1)
Hypoxia (n = 2)
Radiation (n = 1)
Hydrocephalus (n = 1)
HC 46   (10.90)
32-69
12   (1.77)
10-17
M (n = 21)
F (n = 14)




Education = years; CVA = cerebrovascular accident, TBI = traumatic brain injury. There were no significant 
differences in age or education between groups. For the ABI group 69% of the sample were male and 31% are 
female, and for the HC group 60% of the sample were male and 40% female.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of performance on all measures 
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     24.00
31.00
<.001***
Significance  *** < .001 , ** < .01, * < .05. 
Table 3. Results of robust multiple linear regression models for the personal reappraisal task 
(ABI group).
*** Significance <.001, ** Significance < .01, * < .05
Model R2  F p (sig.) β coefficients 
(bootstrapped)









0.38 .177 -0.48 – 1.15
Verbal Ability 0.29 .241 -0.42 – 1.13
Inhibition
 
-0.42 .302 1.91 – 1.05
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.25 .041* -0.54 – 0.04
Verbal Ability -0.07 .191 -0.26 – 0.11
Inhibition -0.17 .399 -0.68 – 0.43
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -1.71 .420 -0.19 – 0.14
Verbal Ability 3.74 .242 -0.06 – 0.14
Inhibition 2.44 .037* -0.01 – 0.51
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)
2.46 .007** 0.07 – 0.42
Table 4. Results of robust multiple linear regression models for the impersonal reappraisal task 
(ABI group)
*** Significance <.001, ** Significance < .01, * < .05
Model R2  F p (sig.) β coefficients 
(bootstrapped)









0.52 .034* -0.05 – 1.07
Verbal Ability 0.21 .204 -0.30 – 0.74
Inhibition
 
0.10 .412 -0.93 – 1.13
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.13 .192 -0.43 – 0.16
Verbal Ability 0.02 .408 -0.19 – 0.23
Inhibition -0.56 .020* -1.11 – -0.02
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory 0.01 .483 -0.15 – 0.15
Verbal Ability -0.04 .211 -0.16 – 0.07
Inhibition 0.18 .041* -0.02 – 0.40
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)
0.09 .035* -0.01 – 0.17
Table 5. Results of robust multiple linear regression models for the personal reappraisal task 
(HC group)
*** Significance <.001, ** Significance < .01, * < .05
Model R2  F p (sig.) β coefficients 
(bootstrapped)










0.27 .388 -1.52 – 2.18
Verbal Ability -0.37 .164 -1.19 – 0.34
Inhibition
 
0.23 .367 -1.89 – 2.87
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.07 .399 -0.53 – 0.34
Verbal Ability 0.09 .208 -0.11 – 0.30
Inhibition -0.74 .004** -1.27 – -0.18
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.04 .438 -0.37 – 0.34
Verbal Ability -0.15 .087 -0.38 – 0.11
Inhibition 0.13 .397 -0.61 – 0.94
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)
0.90 .002** 0.30 – 1.96
Table 6. Results of robust multiple linear regression models for the impersonal reappraisal task 
(HC group)
*** Significance <.001, ** Significance < .01, * < .05
Model R2  F p (sig.) β coefficients 
(bootstrapped)










-0.51 .165 -1.83 – 0.80
Verbal Ability -0.03 .447 -0.65 – 0.63
Inhibition
 
0.47 .301 -1.56 – 2.05
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.05 .456 -0.77 – 0.57
Verbal Ability 0.01 .438 -0.32 – 0.35
Inhibition -0.86 .093 -2.35 – 0.37
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)




Working Memory -0.16 .153 -0.50 – 0.21
Verbal Ability 0.02 .363 -0.11 – 0.21
Inhibition -0.14 .337 -0.71 – 0.41
Baseline intensity 
(covariate)






















Task Correlation coefficients (p value)
Personal reappraisal task ERQ-CA
Reappraisal Productivity .41  (.002)**
Reappraisal Difficulty (seconds) -.34  (.011)**
Reappraisal Effectiveness .559  (< .001)***
Impersonal reappraisal Task
Reappraisal Productivity .30  (.026)*
Reappraisal Difficulty (seconds) -.14  (.321)
Reappraisal Effectiveness .09  (.507)
HC Group
Task Correlation coefficients (p value)
Personal Reappraisal Task ERQ-CA
Reappraisal Productivity .10  (.560)
Reappraisal Difficulty (seconds) -.02  (.901)
Reappraisal Effectiveness .16  (.371)
Impersonal reappraisal Task
Reappraisal Productivity .40  (.018)*
Reappraisal Difficulty (seconds) -.19  (.288)
Reappraisal Effectiveness -.10  (.588)
Appendix A -  Personal reappraisal and Impersonal Reappraisal Task Instructions
Personal reappraisal task (IAPS stimuli)
Introduction. The task was introduced as follows “Sometimes people try to make 
themselves feel better by looking on the bright side of things. You will see a series of pictures on 
the screen. Spend a little bit of time looking at the picture. You will then rate how intense your 
emotional response to the picture on a 0 to 10 scale, with 10 being most intense. The next step is 
to think of as many positive sides of what you are seeing as you can, as quickly as you can. After 
thinking of the positive sides, rate how you feel again on the same 0 to 10 scale”. 
As pictures which result in lower emotional intensity ratings can be up-regulated into 
positive this was explained in more detail: “Low scores on the scale mean less intensely and high 
scores mean more intense. However, if your emotional response to an image is low, you can up-
regulate to positive. That is, you can think of higher numbers on the scale to mean that you feel 
more positive about it. Do you understand the difference?” Before we start we have time to 
practice”.
Practice. Patients were then trained on the task using two IAPS pictures. Following this, 
participants were shown the 0-10 scale, and the description of the scale was repeated again. They 
were then required to think of reappraisals when prompted by the written cue “Think of the 
positive sides. Try to be quick”, before examples of possible reappraisals were provided. For Set 
A, one of the practice pictures was ‘Truck’ which included a vehicle stuck in mud with people 
pushing it, and example reappraisals are ‘People are helping each other’ and ‘they will get out 
without damage’. The emotion intensity scale was shown and explained again. If the participant 
did not understand the task, the practice procedure was repeated, until the participant was 
satisfied that they understood what was required during the task. 
Testing. Participants engaged with each picture for as long as they felt necessary to grasp 
its content. Their responses to the reappraising cue (“Think of the positive sides. Try to be 
quick”) were timed and audio-recorded. These recordings were later transcribed verbatim. If 
participants struggled to think of reappraisals after two minutes, they were prompted as per Salas 
et al., 2013 (e.g. ‘Could you please try to think of the positive sides of this?’).
Impersonal Reappraisal Task (autobiographical recall stimuli)
Introduction. The task was introduced as follows “Sometimes people try to make 
themselves feel better by looking on the bright side of things. You will see an emotion word on 
the screen, it will be either sad, scared, angry, or neutral. When you see each word, try to recall 
an event in your life that caused you to feel that emotion. Try to be very detailed about the way 
you feel. Following this, you will rate how intensely you feel that emotion now, upon describing 
the event, on a 0 to 10 scale, with 10 being most intense. The next step is to think of as many 
positive sides of that situation as you can, as quickly as you can. After thinking of the positive 
sides, rate how you feel again on the same 0 to 10 scale”. 
As the “neutral” condition involves the up-regulation of emotion from neutral to happy, 
this was explained in more detail: “With sad, scared, and angry, low scores on the scale mean 
less intensely and high scores mean more intense. However, with neutral, the more neutral it is, 
the lower the score, and high scores mean happy. Do you understand the difference?” Before we 
start we have time to practice”.
Practice. Patients were then trained on the task using an “angry”, and then a “neutral” 
practice condition, with examples of two stories: Having an argument for the “angry” condition, 
and watching television for the “neutral” condition. Following this, participants were shown the 
0-10 scale, and the description of the scale was repeated again. They were then required to think 
of reappraisals when prompted by the written cue “Think of the positive sides. Try to be quick”, 
before examples of possible reappraisals were provided. For the “neutral” condition the example 
reappraisals were “I was watching television with family, which I am lucky to have and spend 
time with” and “It was nice to have an evening to relax”. The example reappraisals for the 
“angry” condition were: “We don’t argue that often” and “Because of this we’ve talked about 
ways we can communicate better in future”. The emotion intensity scale was shown and 
explained again. If the participant did not understand the task, the practice procedure was 
repeated, until the participant was satisfied that they understood what was required during the 
task. 
Testing. Participants were informed that they have a maximum of three minutes to 
describe their stories (as per Salas et al., 2015), but they could use more time if needed. Their 
responses to the reappraising cue (“Think of the positive sides. Try to be quick”) were timed and 
audio-recorded. These recordings are later transcribed verbatim. If participants struggled to think 
of stories, they were prompted with generic stories, for example “Some people would say they 
were sad when they lost a pet or family member”, “Some people would say they were angry 
when they came across someone being rude or disrespectful”, “Some would say they were 
scared when they feared for their or their family’s safety or well-being”, “Some would say they 
were neutral when going for a walk”. Previous work using an ASR task, however, shows that 
brain-injured patients are able to recall emotional events (Salas et al., 2015, Turnbull et al., 
2005). In line with this, all patients were able to recall stories, though some required additional 
prompting during the “neutral” condition, which consisted of asking the participant what they did 
on the days leading up to the testing session. 
Appendix 1 – Details of IAPS sets
Details of IAPS sets
Set A – Mean Valence = 3.10 (SD = 0.84), Mean Arousal = 5.25 (SD = 0.75)
Practice: 2683 WAR









Set B - Mean Valence = 3.00 (SD = 0.80), Mean Arousal = 4.91 (SD = 0.85)
Practice: 9495 FIRE








2520 ELDERLY MAN 
Set C - Mean Valence = 2.70 (SD = 0.70), Mean Arousal = 5.45 (SD = 0.77)
Practice: 9435 ACCIDENT
Practice: 9280 SMOKE








Set D - Mean Valence = 3.00 (SD = 0.61), Mean Arousal = 5.35 (SD = 0.69)
Practice: 2272 LONELY BOY




















Appendix C- Example transcriptions of participants’ reappraisals on both tasks 
ABI patient 1
Personal Task (Story Recall: Scared when they were unable to provide for family following 
brain injury)
Reappraisals: Positive sides, like my wife says, I have recovered, I've come back from dire 
consequences. I suppose, I’ve recovered from something I don’t understand, got back on the 
bike, and got back to work. I’ve had the great help of [Psychologist’s name] at the service. My 
friends have been amazing and my family, and the love shown to me by people [**Exhales 
loudly. Eyes tear up**], I swear to god, one of the things that helped me recover is looking back 
at messages and the love shown to me and my situation [**voice breaks from emotion**]. And 
you can have bad times in your life when you think the world is against you, but you learn 
through adversity that they are not, and that is a great feeling, you think my god, there's some 
good people out there and that is truly great. Faith in humanity definitely. I feel good now.
Impersonal task (Sick Baby picture)
Reappraisals: Oh god… oh god I feel that…makes me feel really… just hope that there's a 
positive outcome… it's an odd picture…. Is it a new born baby…or is it? It's odd…There’s 
nothing else positive. 
ABI patient 2
Personal Task (Story Recall: Sad when family dog was sick) 
Reappraisals: We actually managed to go to RSPCA vets who helped, and they were cheaper. 
We definitely got a better vet, who gave her a really good check over and the right medication. 
The pill was cheaper than the one at the normal vets, and we left feeling like we hadn’t been 
ripped off. We gave them extra money as a good will gesture because, they are a charity and 
needed the money, and I felt pretty good having done that. 
Impersonal task (Sick man picture)
Reappraisals: I don't know enough information about it…The guy seems pretty ill. I don’t know 
whether he is… I don’t know if he is going to survive or pass away, so I don’t know. It’s not a 
very pleasant picture. 
 ABI patient 3
Personal Task (Story Recall: Neutral when going Kayaking) 
Reappraisals: The positive sides is the company I have when I go, the people who are out on the 
water with me, from all sorts of backgrounds, young and old, fantastic company. When I’m out 
there I forget about everything that’s going on in my life outside the kayaking. The surrounding 
is fantastic, the views form the lake is stunning. It enhances my life really, it’s superb, one of the 
best things I’ve ever done was getting in to it. And of course, it keeps me fit. The emotions take 
over, it gives me things to talk about, and it’s all I think about, comparing this week’s views with 
the previous week. Now I can’t really measure how much more positive I feel, it consumes me. 
Impersonal task (Lonely man picture)
Reappraisals: I don’t really have any personal attachment to the picture…if I did it would be 
different…but I can empathise with this chap looking out the window. Nothing much in the 
house, suggests poverty to me…the positive is that he has a view out of his window, and maybe 
he is waiting for someone to come and visit…that’s it really. 
HC participant 
Personal Task (Story Recall: Having to take family dog for euthanasia)  
Reappraisals: Positive side is just how lucky I am to have had her in my life and all the love and 
fun she brought. I have the happy memories to cheer me up when I’m sad about it. And I 
guess…knowing that I did the right thing by her, and that she is now out of her pain, makes me 
feel better. All the family were there with her at the time giving her treats, so she was as 
comfortable as she could have been. And she had a great life with us.”
Impersonal task (Boys picture)
Reappraisals: Oh... Well, the kids have each other. They are probably just playing in the dirt, 
having fun, being kids. They don’t look like they are malnourished or anything like that.
